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Abstract: 
This article takes issue with a recent book by Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) of the 
same title. Ziliak and McCloskey argue that statistical significance testing is a 
barrier rather than a booster for empirical research in many fields and should 
therefore be abandoned altogether. The present article argues that this is good advice 
in some research areas but not in others. Taking all issues which have appeared so 
far of the German Economic Review and a recent epidemiological meta-analysis as 
examples, it shows that there has indeed been a lot of misleading work in the context 
of significance testing, and that at the same time many promising avenues for 
fruitfully employing statistical significance tests, disregarded by Ziliak and 
McCloskey, have not been used. 
                                                 
1
 Research supported by DFG under SFB 823. On purpose, the title is the same as that of a recent 
book by Ziliak and McClowskey (2008). I am grateful to Michael Bücker and Ronja Walter for 
excellent research assistance, and to Stephen Ziliak for comments on a book review in Statistical 
Papers on which this article is based.  
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1. Introduction and summary 
A significant statistical test only means: if the null hypothesis were true – a big if – 
then the tail probability of the observed event would be less than a pre- chosen level 
of significance. This rather modest claim is even further compromised by its 
extreme dependence on the size and on the generation of the sample and by the 
common practice of disguised multiple testing. i.e. doing lots of tests and reporting 
only the most “significant” results, and the ensuing understatement of the true 
probability of an error of the first kind (“data mining”). This is what every decent 
statistician knows, or at least should have been taught in any introductory 
mathematical statistics course. 
Additional, rather popular empirical improprieties are HARKing (“Hypothesizing 
after the Results are Known), collective as opposed to individual data mining, and 
what I call an Error of the Third Kind, by which I mean mistaking a rejected null as 
proof that the alternative is true. All of these deficiencies figure prominently in a 
critical literature of long standing that is summarized in section 2 below. But the 
critique which is the subject of the present paper is much more fundamental. It dates 
back at least to Tyler (1931), Sterling (1959) and Rozeboom (1960) and concludes 
that even it significance testing were properly done according to the rules of the 
game, it would still be fundamentally flawed as an approach to empirical research in 
many fields due to implied disregard of what really counts in many applications, the 
size, as opposed to the mere existence, of an effect. Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) 
have created the neologism “oomph” for this; they argue “that ’oomph’, the 
difference a treatment makes, dominates precision” (p. xvii), and that a rather 
disproportionate amount of attention is devoted to the latter, taking away scarce 
resources from more promising avenues of research. 
There are therefore three types of misleading test-based inference: (a) there is no 
effect, but due to technical deficiencies, “significance” nevertheless obtains, (b) 
there is a large effect (much “oomph”), but due to variability, it is not “significant” 
and therefore discarded (c) there is only a small effect (no “oomph”) , but due to 
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precision it is highly “significant” and therefore taken seriously. Taken together, 
these sources of error have led McCloskey (2002, p. 44) to conclude: “The progress 
of economic science has been seriously damaged [by the common practice of 
significance testing]. You can’t believe anything that comes out of [it]. Not a word. 
It is all nonsense, which future generations of economists are going to have to do all 
over again. Most of what appears in the best journals of economics is unscientific 
rubbish. I find this unspeakably sad. All my friends, my dear, dear friends in 
economics, have been wasting their time....They are vigorous, difficult, demanding 
activities, like hard chess problems. But they are worthless as science.“ Or even 
more bluntly, in her book with Ziliak (2008): ”If null-hypothesis significance testing 
is as idiotic as we and other critics have so long believed, how on earth has it 
survived?” (p. 240)). 
One can hardly imagine a more devastating critique of this aspect of empirical work 
in economics (or in any other field). 
The purpose of the present article is to put the Ziliak-McCloskey view into 
perspective, by supporting it for some types of tests but not for others. The first class 
of tests, where much is going wrong indeed, is sometimes referred to as 
“presumptive“ or “confirmatory” testing (see e.g. Tang et al. 1993). It is from here 
that Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) and other critics draw most of their examples. 
Confirmatory testing means that there is a particular alternative one has in mind, 
with the aim or wish of establishing this as true. Section 2 summarizes various 
illegal ways in which this goal is often achieved in applications, plus related 
aberrations when interpreting confirmatory tests. Section 3 exemplifies such type (a) 
mistakes using a recent example from epidemiology, while Section 4 considers type 
(b) and (c) mistakes. This is done by checking all empirical articles ever from the 
German Economic Review, the Journal of the Verein für Socialpolitik, which is 
distributed to about 4000 member four times a year. Both sections confirm Ziliak 
and McCloskey (2008) insofar as lots of useless and misleading inferences are 
unearthed. But they also show that confirmatory testing only makes sense, no matter 
whether one is after mere significance or “oomph”, if the underlying model is 
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reasonably correct, and that it is the common failure to test for this which is the real 
threat to meaningful statistical results. 
Such tests, often called “exploratory” or “specification” tests (see Krämer and 
Sonnberger 1986), are the topic of the final section 5. Specification tests are not 
aimed at any specific alternative, so a rejection of the null only tells the investigator 
that he or she should look out for a better model, without establishing whichever 
type of “effect” there is supposed to exist. They are also more in line with the 
Popperian paradigm of scientific progress, where the null hypothesis corresponds to 
established beliefs, to be abandoned only in the presence of compelling evidence. In 
a sense, therefore, the Ziliak-McCloskey argument is turned on its head: in order to 
extract meaningful information (“oomph”) from the economy or whatever field of 
application via formal statistical models, one has to do a lot of significance testing 
first. 
 
2. Confirmatory testing and errors of the third kind 
A significance level of α = 5% for a statistical test implies that, even when the null 
hypothesis were true, the procedure would still reject it in roughly 5 out of 100 
experiments. In the context of a specific alternative, usually some kind of “effect”, 
this means that even without any effect being present, the test will nevertheless 
claim one in roughly 5 out of 100 trials. This is the well known error of the first 
kind. 
A first objection to the routine use of statistical significance testing concerns the 
ease with which a significant test often leads to what I have termed above an error of 
the third kind: to assume that a significant test implies that the alternative is true: 
“The sin comes in believing a causal hypothesis is true because your study came up 
with a positive result” (Sander Greenland from UCLA, as quoted in Taubes, 1995, p. 
169). 
This error of the third kind, or some variant such as “the null hypothesis is wrong 
with 95 % probability” occurs even among professional statisticians. Haller and 
Krauss (2002) have asked 30 statistics instructors, 44 statistics students and 39 
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practicing researchers from six psychology departments in Germany about the 
meaning of a significant two-sample t-test (significance level = 1%). The test was 
supposed to detect a possible treatment effect based on a control group and a 
treatment group. The subjects were asked to comment upon the following six 
statements (all of which are false). They were told in advance that several or perhaps 
none of the statements were correct. 
1) You have absolutely disproved the null hypothesis (that is, that there is 
no difference between the population means).            m true / false m 
2) You have found the probability of the null hypothesis being true. 
m true / false m 
3) You have absolutely proved your experimental hypothesis (that there is a 
difference between the population means).      m true / false m 
4) You can deduce the probability of the experimental hypothesis being 
true.                m true / false m 
5) You know, if you decide to reject the null hypothesis, the probability that 
you are making the wrong decision.     m true / false m 
6) You have a reliable experimental finding in the sense that if, 
hypothetically, the experiment were repeated a great number of times, you 
would obtain a significant result on 99% of occasions.     m true / false m 
All of the statistics students, 90% of the practicing psychologists and 80% of the 
methodology instructors marked at least one of the above faulty statements as 
correct. And what is more, even lots of statistics textbooks do. Examples from the 
German market include Wyss (1991, p. 547) or Schuchard-Fischer et al. (1982), who 
on p. 83 of their best-selling textbook explicitly advise their readers that a rejection 
of the null at 5% implies a probability of 95% that the alternative is correct. For 
details, see Krämer and Gigerenzer (2005) or Krämer (2008, chapter 8). 
A second, even more popular mistake is to claim some nominal significance level α  
when in reality the reported test statistic is the most significant one among n trials, 
each conducted at the level α . The true significance level is then simply the 
probability that the maximum of n test statistics is larger than some critical value 
and increases rapidly with n. Krämer and Runde (1992) have used this device to 
establish what they call the "Krämer-Runde-seven-modulo 1 effect." This means in 
words, that on days of the month Nr. 1, 8, 15, 22, and 29 the German stock price 
index DAX performs significantly better than average (t=3.161). Or in technical 
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terms, the null hypothesis that stocks perform the same on these days as on others 
could be rejected, given the available data, at a level of 5%. What Krämer and 
Runde also did were tests of many other hypotheses: There is no six-modulo-2-
effect, there is no six-modulo-3-effect, there is no seven-modulo- 2-effect, eight-
modulo-3-effect, and so on, ad nauseam. Given a particular data set and one hundred 
such hypotheses, all of them true, one is still bound to find about 5 "significant" 
effects, i.e. rejections of the null. And it is well known (see e.g. McCloskey 1985 or 
Ziliak and McCloskey 2008) that many other authors procede along similar lines, 
without reporting the unsuccessful trials. See also Krämer (2010, chapter 15). 
This multiple testing problem has of course long been recognized in statistical 
research, see Krämer and Sonnberger (1986, chapter 6) for an overview of the early 
literature in econometrics and Tang et al. (1993) or Altmann et al. (2001) for some 
advice on how to cope with this problem in biometric applications. But is seems that 
the enormous theoretical work that has been done here has not yet made its way into 
routine empirical applications. And even if it had, it seems that the many restrictions 
that are attached to many multiple testing approaches would severely limit their 
impact on the problem we are discussing here. 
In economics, this habit of reporting only the most “significant” results is sometimes 
referred to as "data mining" (Lovell, 1983)2. It is of course strictly illegal and rightly 
frowned upon, but has nevertheless been common practice in empirical economics 
ever since statistical test of significance have been introduced. 
Not illegal, but equally misleading, is the related phenomenon known as 
“publication bias”: “There is some evidence that in fields where statistical tests of 
significance are commonly used, research which yields nonsignificant results is not 
published” (Sterling 1959, p. 30). “Such research being unknown to other 
investigators may be repeated independently until eventually by chance a significant 
result occurs.” Taken to the limit, this argument implies that a “significant“ effect 
will be found eventually almost surely, no matter what. 
                                                 
2
 Not to be confused with the serious business of the same name that is a modern subject of computer 
science 
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Denton (1985) calls this "collective data mining"; it happens even when no 
individual investigator engages in this practice and has long been to grossly distort 
the type 1 error probabilities wherever formal testing for significance is done. In 
psychology, this bias towards the alternative is known as the file drawer problem: 
negative results remain stuck in the file drawer. In medicine, Stern and Simes (1997) 
report that among 748 studies approved by the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital Ethics 
committee between 1979 and 1988, about 85% were eventually published if they 
reported significant results at levels 5% or less. Among studies which did not report 
significant results, the percentage of accepted papers was only 50 %. See also Beck-
Bernholdt and Dubben (2004). 
 
3. A particular application in detail: Childhood leukemia in the vicinity of 
nuclear power plants 
Following Krämer and Arminger (2010), this section exemplifies the type (a) 
deficiencies explained in section 2 via a recent study of childhood leukemia in the 
vicinity of nuclear power plants - a meta analysis combining various previous 
investigations and some data collected independently - prepared by Greiser (2009) 
for the political party "Bündnis 90 / Grüne". Like many others, it purports to show 
that nuclear power plants induce a “statistically significantly elevated risk of 
leukemia for all age groups considered” (p. 3)3  and starts with an error of the third 
kind: mistaking a rejected null hypothesis as proof that the alternative is true. "AKW 
erhöhen das Leukämierisiko (nuclear power plants increase risk of leukemia)" was 
the heading of a press release distributed by Bündnis 90 /Grüne in the fall of 2009, 
which strongly contributed to the fiercely held belief by many Germans that nuclear 
power is bad for you. 
The present section exemplifies the arguments from section 2 by showing that not 
even statistical significance obtains. A first type (a) mistake is HARKing: 
“Hypothesizing after the results are known”. As Kruskal (1969) puts it, “Almost any 
set of data […] will show anomalies of some kind when examined carefully, even if 
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the underlying probabilistic structure is wholly random – that is, even if the 
observations stem from random variables that are independent and identically 
distributed. By looking carefully enough at random data, one can generally find 
some anomaly […] that gives statistical significance at customary levels although no 
real effect is present” (p. 247). A famous example is one of the very first 
applications of significance testing at all, the observation made by astronomers that 
the orbital planes of the planets are quite close together. In 1734, Daniel Bernoulli 
and his son John computed the probability that this is due to chance (given that 
orbital planes are determined randomly; in modern language, they computed  the 
prob-value of a test; see Todhunter1949, sections 394-397). This probability 
however is only correct if the particular anomaly had been established beforehand, 
and is larger otherwise. 
The same is true in the context of the leukemia vs nuclear power debate. In 
Germany, for instance, testing on a massive scale started only after an abnormal 
cluster of leukemia cases was found close to the Krümmel power generation plant. 
But there are dozens of additional illnesses which might be examined for clusters: 
Sudden death syndrome, other types of cancer, birth defects of all sorts, Alzheimer, 
Parkinson, high blood pressure and so on. According to Kruskal, the chances that 
some such malady can be “significantly” associated with nuclear power plants are 
almost one. 
Then there is the publication bias, which is bound to particularly affect any meta-
analyses which collect together previous work. At the time of this writing, there are 
well above 1000 nuclear installations worldwide available for testing. But the meta-
analysis by Greiser is based on only 80 of these, located in the UK, France, 
Germany, the U.S. and Canada. What about the others? How many studies which 
did not find an excess of childhood leukemia have never made it into print? For 
instance, no excess incidence has so far been reported for nuclear sites in Japan, 
Taiwan, Sweden, Spain and Switzerland. Given the enormous media interest in 
occurrences of this kind, one can certainly be sure that any leukemia cluster close to 
                                                                                                                                         
3
 English translation. The German original says: “Die Ergebnisse zeigen ein statistisch signifikant 
erhöhtes Erkrankungsrisiko an Leukämie für alle untersuchten Altersgruppen.” 
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a nuclear facility in these countries would have made headlines there as well. 
Therefore, the absence of such headlines provides evidence that no such clusters 
have occurred, or that studies reporting this absence have not made it into print. 
Another important degree of freedom is the time period under consideration. The 
literature abounds with examples where excess mortality or morbidity was found in 
certain periods, but not in others. For instance, the studies from Canada quoted by 
Greiser (2009), reporting excess incidence of childhood leukemia around Canadian 
nuclear power plants, cover only years up to 1986. It is rather safe to assume (and 
confirmed by private information from Canadian authorities) that no excess 
incidence was observed thereafter. 
Then one has to choose a distance from the potential source of radiation. 
Conventional choices are 6.5 km, 15 km, 20 km, 25 km, 50 km or complete 
counties, like in most studies from Canada and the U.S.. Again, there is an 
abundance of examples where excess incidence or mortality was observed for some 
distances, but not for others. 
Then there is the type of cancer (myeloid leukaemia – ML, acute lymphoblastic 
leukaemia – ALL, acute non-lymphoblastic leukemia, Non-Hodgkin lymphoma, 
other cancers), which likewise might lead to an excess for one type and a deficit for 
another. The age group of the children is also important, as many studies report an 
excess of leukemia for some age groups, and a deficit for others. For details, see 
Krämer and Arminger (2010). 
It is obvious that by judiciously adjusting these parameters it is trivial to establish 
“significant” effects of any sort. Good examples are Hoffmann et al. (1995) or 
Körblein and Hoffmann (1999, p. 18), who, being dissatisfied with negative results 
from another epidemiological study, got what they wanted using the same data set: 
“A reanalysis of the data … reveals a statistically significant increase in childhood 
cancers … when the evaluation is restricted to commercial power reactors, the 
vicinities closest to the plants and children of the youngest age group.”  
Greiser (2009), using previously published data from the UK, France, Germany, and 
Canada, plus self-collected date from cancer registries in the U.S., obtains 2127 
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cases of leukemia for the age group 0-4. This compares to an expected number of 
only 1969, and would, in the context of a designed experiment, indicate a significant 
(at 5%) increase in risk. 
This significance however appears to be mostly due to data mining and publication 
bias; it vanishes completely – in fact, the sign of the observed effect is reversed - , 
once an obvious failure of the underlying model, the total disregard of important 
confounding factors, is accounted for. According to Ries et. al (1999, figure 6 and 
table 1.5), and confirmed by many others, important risk factors for childhood 
leukemia are race and sex. For instance, childhood cancer incidence in the U.S. is 
30% higher for boys as compared to girls and almost double for whites as compared 
to blacks. For leukemia only, the highest incidence rates are observed among 
hispanics (48.5 per million as compared to 41.6 per million for whites and 25,8 per 
million for blacks). By far the lowest rates for any type of childhood cancer are 
observed for American Indians. 
Also, leukemia incidence correlates strongly with income – the higher the income of 
the parents, the larger the risk of leukemia for kids. In Scotland, for instance, the 
incidence of childhood leukemia between the richest and the poorest subpopulations 
differs by as much as 50%. Other risk factors which have been identified so far are 
population density and population mixing, which both might likewise lead to an 
increased exposure of susceptible individuals to infections and local epidemics 
which in turn could later promote the onset of cancers of many types. 
It would be surprising if these established covariates did not also affect the numbers 
reported by Greiser (2009). For instance, the plant that contributes most to the 
surplus of 158 leukemia cases in the Greiser study is San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station in Southern California, in the northwestern corner of San Diego County, 
south of the city of San Clemente. According to Greiser (2009, p. 21, table 4) there 
were 281 cases of childhood leukemia close to San Onofre (which in this case 
means: in San Diego County) in the 2001-2006 time period, compared to only 177 
expected cases, an excess of 104. Therefore, this single data point contributes almost 
all of the 158 excess cases on which the “significant” increase of childhood 
leukemia in the vicinity of nuclear power plants is based. 
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Now, looking closer at the San Onofre site, it appears that virtually all confounding 
factors which have so far been established in the literature are higher there than 
elsewhere in the U.S. For instance, San Diego County is rather wealthy, with 
average household income 20 % above the national average. In addition, San Diego 
county has an above-average population of Hispanics and very few blacks. Also, 
both population density and population mixing are more pronounced in San Diego 
county than elsewhere in the U.S.. San Diego is the largest concentration of naval 
facilities in the world, with a constant moving in and out of families, which is even 
further accentuated by a large University and many more military facilities such as 
training camps, airbases, Marine Corps Recruit Depots and coast guard stations. All 
of these variables correlate strongly with childhood leukemia.  
However, removing San Onofre from the Greiser (2009) data set, and adding some 
studies he has overlooked, the initial surplus of leukemia cases turns into a deficit, 
see Krämer and Arminger (2010). This section therefore shows that one complaint 
against significance testing raised by Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) – spurious 
significance due to bad practice – is certainly warranted by current practice in many 
fields. But it also shows that any claims as to significance of any sort require that the 
underlying model be reasonably correct. 
 
4. Eleven years of significance testing in the German Economic Review 
This section turns to type (b) and type (c) mistakes, i.e. neglecting large effects 
which are not “significant” and celebrating trivial effects which are significant only 
due to sample size, by scrutinizing all issues which have appeared so far of the 
German Economic Review. The German Economic Review is the official Journal of 
the Verein für Socialpolitik, an association of about 4000 German speaking 
economists from all over the world. It was inaugurated in 2000 as the English 
language successor to the venerable Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialwissenschaften, also known as “Schmollers Jahrbuch”, with a history dating 
back to 1871. At the time of this writing it is in its 12th year of existence, so there are 
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11 complete volumes which in this section will be scrutinized for misleading 
applications of statistical tests of significance. 
Table 1 provides a summary. It shows that about 40% of all articles published so far 
rely for their results both on data and on formal tests of significance of the 
confirmatory type (a vast majority being t-tests of the significance of some effect). 
This percentage has been increasing recently, but is still somewhat less than Ziliak 
and McCloskey (2008, chapters 6 and 7) find for the American Economic Review 
1980-1999. 
Table 1: Confirmatory significance tests in the German Economic Review 
Volume Number of 
articles 
Articles with 
confirmatory 
significance 
tests 
Number of 
confirmatory 
significance 
tests 
Only sign, no 
effect 
1 21 8 421 4 
2 24 9 527 0 
3 21 7 725 332 
4 22 5 176 22 
5 20 10 994 40 
6 25 10 1359 87 
7 22 9 653 0 
8 24 11 1375 0 
9 24 11 1171 0 
10 28 12 1809 0 
11 27 18 1365 1 
Together 258 110 10575 486 
 
The rather astonishing number of more than 10.000 tests of significance, i.e. about 
1000 tests per volume, is of course due to the routine production of such tests by 
commercial software packages that are used by the authors to fit their models. And 
more often than not, they result in comments of the type “X has a significantly 
positive impact on Y”, without any reference to its magnitude. In 486 cases, the 
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exact magnitude of the estimated coefficients are not even reported, the only 
information given being that they were “significant”. 
Even this attribute is doubtful given the prevalence of comments like “table 2 
presents the results of our final model estimation”. Obviously, this means that 
various estimates and tests were computed beforehand, with only the most 
“significant” results remaining to be shown, so the scientific value of such tests is 
close to zero: “Cheap t-tests, becoming steadily cheaper with falling computational 
costs, have in equilibrium a marginal scientific product equal to their cost” (Ziliak 
and McCloskey 2008, p. 112). And when the costs of tests tend to zero, their 
informational value seems to follow straight in line. 
This is true even if the tests as such were properly done. Table 2 confirms that not 
even this is true in many cases. It provides information on various additional 
features of the 110 papers which report tests of significance.  
 
Table 2: Three types of mistakes 
Type (c) error: Confusion of economic and statistical 
significance of estimated coefficients or effects (“significant” 
used for both? Much ado about statistically significant but 
economically small coefficients or effects?)  
62/110 
= 56.4% 
Type (b) error: Economically significant and plausible effects or 
coefficients discarded due to lack of statistical significance?  
31/110 
= 28.2% 
No or only passing discussion of the dependence of 
“significance” on the correct specification of the model? 
(Independent and/or identically distributed observations etc.)  
78/110 
= 70.1% 
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Among papers that rely on some form of regression, most choose a linear functional 
form without much or even without any discussion whatsoever. Some also exclude 
or include variables solely on the basis of statistical significance, paying little 
attention to relevant economic theory. And only very rarely there was awareness of 
the multiple testing problem when only final versions of regression models were 
presented. Table 3 gives the details. 
 
Table 3: Selected deficiencies of papers that use some sort of regression model 
No detailed discussion of the appropriateness of the chosen model 
(no theoretical justification for the particular functional form, no 
or only cursory diagnostic testing etc) 
56/98 
= 57.1% 
Explanatory variables included or excluded exclusively or almost 
exclusively on the basis of statistical significance? 
20/98 
= 20.4% 
Several models tried, only the final one presented, but no 
awareness of the multiple testing problem 
14/98 
= 14.2% 
 
The critique summarized in table 1 to 3 is not meant to denigrate a particular journal 
or empirical work in the German Economic Review as such. In fact, the particular 
approach which is criticised here appears to be common to most economic journals 
in the world and is even more prevalent, if Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) are to be 
believed, in the American Economic Review, which is the leading journal in the 
field. Also, there are many fine empirical papers in the German Economic Review 
which, to convey their message, do not rely on confirmatory significance tests at 
all.4 And even if tests are reported, it is sometimes with some sort of tongue in 
cheek, to pay respect to some tradition which not even the authors do take seriously 
any more. And it is exactly this what the present paper wants to emphasize: that the 
                                                 
4
 A recent example is Bachmann and Burda (2010), who convincingly summarise and explain labour 
market dynamics in Germany, using lots of tables and figures, but no t-tests whatsoever. 
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endless tables of t-values that adorn most empirical papers nowadays are indeed 
what Ziliak and McCloskey call them  - a needless waste of space and time. 
 
5. Specification testing vs. searching for effects 
An important point often overlooked in the significance debate is that any such 
claim – no matter whether it only concerns the existence or also the size of an effect 
– is only valid if the underlying statistical model describes the data reasonably well. 
In particular, as was shown in section 3, one has to ensure that all relevant 
explanatory variables have been properly accounted for. And it is here that statistical 
test of significance can help researchers along their way a lot. This is best 
exemplified with the help of the standard linear regression model  
 yi = β0 + β1xi1 +… + βKxiK + ui  (i=1,…,n), 
where the y’s are to be explained, the xik are observations on K explanatory 
variables (regressors, exogenous variables, design variables), and the ui’s are 
unobservable disturbance terms, presumably uncorrelated, with equal variance and 
expectation zero. Confirmatory testing in this context means establishing the 
"significance" of individual regressors, i.e. testing H0: βk=0 for some k = 1,…,K. As 
was shown in section 4, and is confirmed by independent investigations by Ziliak 
and McCloskey (2008), well above 99 % of all statistical tests reported in a typical 
economics journal are of this type, with all the ensuing complications discussed in 
sections 2 and 3. 
What is much more rarely done, but should be standard practise, is testing whether 
the model that is entertained provides a proper approximation to the data in the first 
place. Only in that case do tests of the confirmatory sort apply. And as shown in 
Krämer et al. (1985), most empirical papers, even in decent journals, fail such 
specification tests, often by wide margins. Among things that can go wrong here are 
omitted regressors (see section 3), non-linearity, in particular interaction effects, 
measurement errors, endogeneity or structural changes in the β-coefficients. Only if 
such deficiencies can be ruled out with some confidence does it make sense to talk 
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about “oomph”, i.e. the size of the βs, (and, if one so chooses, to test for their 
significance). Or to put this differently, one should first test whether the assumptions 
concerning the (conditional) first moments of the y’s are indeed correct before 
proceeding to establish any kind of effect.5 So if one takes seriously what most 
critics of standard statistical significance testing maintain, that it is the size and not 
the significance of effects which really counts, then one has to do some significance 
testing first. 
Krämer and Sonnberger (1986) provide an overview of the early literature of 
statistical specification testing. An extremely simple procedure known as the 
RESET (Regression Specification Error Test) for instance only involves adding 
artificial regressors like squares, cubes or cross products of the initial regressors and 
testing whether they are significant. If so, there is evidence that the initial linear 
functional form is not correct. Or, for time series data, one could simply compare 
parameter estimates obtained from the initial model to estimates obtained from the 
same data after first differencing. If the model were correct, both estimators estimate 
the same things and should be close to each other. If not, there is evidence again that 
something is wrong with the model (an idea which has been generalized by 
Hausman (1978) to various other pairs of estimators). Krämer and Sonnberger 
(1986) collect together a generous toolbox of such techniques for checking model 
adequacy. 
A related class of specification tests do not challenge a given model, because the 
underlying model is in most cases rather obvious and simple, but test whether or not 
certain parameters in this model are compatible with established economic theory. 
An example is the test for weekday anomalies for stock returns, see Krämer and 
Runde (1992). Financial theory requires that expected excess returns are positive 
and equal to each other for all days of the week, or that successive returns have 
autocorrelation zero. Again, one is not interested here in the size of the effect, but 
rather in whether one exists in the first place, the only problem being the distinction 
between statistical and practical significance (small deviations from theory cannot 
                                                 
5
 As compared to the desasters resulting from incorrectly specified first moments, the implications of 
incorrectly specified second or even higher moments (autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, 
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be exploited due to trading costs). One might call such procedures “theory-
attacking-tests” (as opposed to “theory-confirming-tests”, which are the prime target 
of the Ziliak-McCloskey critique.) 
Unfortunately, specification tests and theory attacking tests are a distinct minority 
among statistical significance tests reported in economics journals. Table 4 gives the 
respective figures for the German Economic Review. 
Table 4: Papers with exploratory or “specification” test (i.e. test where an 
acceptance of Ho is fine) 
Number of papers where such tests are done at all 26 
Number of papers which discuss the power of such tests 4/26 = 15,4% 
 
Examples of papers from recent volumes of the German Economic Review that rely 
at least partially on specification tests are Zarzoso et al. (2009. p. 327): 
“Specification tests also rejected the inclusion of a quadratic aid-term in the 
estimated equation”) or Feld and Reulier (2009), who investigate the effect on a 
Swiss canton’s personal income tax rate of various regressors, including the 
corresponding rates of neigbouring cantons. In addition to lots of confirmatory 
testing, they also test whether their regressors are truly exogenous: ”Equation (1) 
cannot consistently be estimated by OLS because there is an obvious endogeneity 
problem. Hausman tests indicate that the neigbouring tax rates at the local level or at 
the regional levels are endogenous” (p. 98). 
More recently, Holtemöller and Schulz (2010, p. 473) present a Wald-Statistic to 
check whether investors behave rationally in the housing market, and Feld and 
Schneider (2010, p. 130) test for the adequacy of an indicator model of the shadow 
economy. However, tests of these types are still dwarfed in number by mindless 
batteries of t-tests attached to parameter estimates. In the German Economic 
Review, the terms “specification test”, “specification testing”, RESET or “Hausman 
                                                                                                                                         
nonnormality) appear rather minor indeed and can also easily be remedied. 
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test” appear less than ten times each in eleven years, that is less than once a year. 
Therefore, as long as such procedures are not standard in applied econometrics, 
Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) do have a point. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The admonition often heart recently to stop testing in empirical economics is 
partially mistaken. While it is true that confirmatory testing, where the null 
hypothesis is only entertained as a dummy to help establishing a prearranged 
alternative, has a huge potential to mislead, and does indeed mislead in many 
applications, specification testing is more important than ever. Therefore, the advice 
should be, not to abandon the concept of significance, but to shift the focus to other 
types of null hypotheses. 
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